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Net Impacts of Active Labor Programs in Hungary and Poland
Christopher J. O'Leary, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

While they have adopted somewhat different macroeconomic strategies for the transition
to a market economy, the central European nations of Hungary and Poland have pursued quite
similar policies for labor market support. To ease economic hardship and facilitate labor
redeployment during the economic restructuring, the governments of these countries provide
unemployment compensation (UC) and a variety of active labor programs (ALPs).
This report reports on a net impact evaluation of the most widely used ALPs in Hungary
and Poland. The analysis relies on extensive person level data gathered through large follow-up
surveys of nationally representative samples of ALP participants and comparison group members
conducted during the first two quarters of 1997. Four types of ALP are examined in this study.
They are: retraining, public works, wage subsidies, and self-employment assistance.
The analysis examines results for each of the alternative programs using the same
measures of success: reemployment, earnings, and conservation of UC funds. It may be unfair to
assess public works from these perspectives since the prime objectives of direct job creation are
income transfer, arresting the deterioration of work place behaviors, and some contribution to
public infrastructure or services. Nonetheless, looking at a group of ALPs all at once with the
same methodology on the same outcomes informs policy makers about the implicit trade-offs
involved when choosing among alternate programs. The findings in Hungary and Poland have
been useful in reshaping policy in those counties. Sharing the findings and evaluation process

may help improve policy and practice in other economies coping with dramatic changes in the
labor market.

Related research
i Some previous investigations of ALP effectiveness in Hungary and Poland during the
transition period have focused on aggregate effects. For example, Boeri (1997) found that
aggregate ALP spending and participation increased the rate of outflow from unemployment
registers of the public employment service to jobs in Poland but not in Hungary.
Puhani and Steiner (1996) used a small sample of ALP participants taken from the
August 1994 supplement to the quarterly Labor Force Survey (LFS) in Poland and found no
significant effects of aggregate ALP expenditure on unemployment, and that public works is
better regarded as an income transfer scheme than as a means of achieving reemployment in a
non-subsidized job. They also suggest that the social dividend from ALP spending in Poland
could be improved by targeting services to people with identifiable barriers to reemployment.
Using the same August 1994 LFS micro data Puhani (1996) found that retraining in Poland did
not improve reemployment prospects, but rather served mainly as an income transfer program.
There have been some gross outcome estimates done for self-employment assistance.
Based on a survey conducted in two Hungarian counties, Frey (1994) estimated that 72.9 percent
of people who received self-employment assistance from the Hungarian Labor Fund in 1992
continued in some type of self-employment at least six months after assistance stopped. There
has been no previous examination of self-employment assistance from the Polish labor fund, but
the Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (1996) reported on the use of Entrepreneurship
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Development Funds (EDFs) set up within small business assistance centers. 1 In the years 1994
to 1996 there were 390 loans given from EDFs. These loans resulted in 779 jobs, or about two
jobs per loan. The mean loan amount was US$4,544 or about US$ 2,275 per job created.
Using person level survey data on participants in retraining, public service employment
(PSE), and a comparison group in Hungary gathered in 1992 and 1993 Godfrey, Lazar and
O'Leary (1993) and O'Leary (1997) found a significant degree of non-random assignment to
ALP participation. While gross impact estimates suggested a nearly 20 percentage point gain in
reemployment rates after retraining, adjusting for observable characteristics the net impact
estimates indicated gains on the order of only 6 percentage points. Selection bias was found to
be less of a problem in the PSE analysis with program participation lowering reemployment rates
by an estimated 15 percentage points.
To date there has been no investigation of wage subsidy type programs in these countries.
However after examining policy alternatives for countries in Central and Eastern Europe,
Jackman (1994) concluded that wage subsidies and self-employment are practical ways to
address unemployment, because these interventions stimulate labor demand without upsetting
other aspects of the economic restructuring process.

'Entrepreneurship Development Funds (EDFs) were set up within small business
assistance centers (SBACs) as part of the World Bank employment project to actively combat
unemployment. Each EDF received an initial endowment from the project, and that money was
intended to act as a seed which would be replenished and grow through loan repayments, interest
collections, and supplements received from local governmental agencies (Mazewska, 1996).
There were 42 SBACs in Poland by the end of 1996 (Kaszuba, 1996).

Context of the evaluations
Since 1990, both Hungary and Poland have experienced dramatic declines in gross
domestic product and increases in unemployment. Table 1 shows how the registered
unemployment rate changed during the first seven years of rapid transition to markets.
In Hungary the unemployment rate rose from nothing in 1990 to a peak of 13.4 percent in
1993 when 705,000 were registered as unemployed job seekers in February. Unemployment
now is slightly below 10 percent largely due to a rise in inactivity; the labor force having shrunk
by more than a million workers.2
Unemployment in Poland changed in parallel with that in Hungary. It jumped from zero
in 1989 to 16.4 percent in 1993. The registered unemployment rate in Poland has only recently
dipped below 13 percent. Labor force withdrawal in Poland has been dampened by the
entitlement to national health insurance which is provided by registration with a local labor office
as an unemployed job seeker.
The transition to a market economy has required relaxed price controls and reduced state
subsidies. These changes combined with the loss of COMECON trading partners resulted in
increased unemployment, rising consumer prices, large public budget deficits, and growing
foreign trade debts. These developments have prompted international monetary authorities to
require ever greater restraint in public spending. Nonetheless, the employment policies pursued

2K6'116, Lazar, Nagy and Szekely (1995) provide evidence from a survey of UC
exhaustees that the decline in Hungarian unemployment was achieved in part through withdrawal
from the labor force mainly by women, and the proliferation of non-reported employment mainly
among men.

in both countries have been impressive, but demonstration of programme effectiveness is crucial
to continued funding.
Since January 1994 an extensive system of performance indicators for monitoring costeffectiveness of ALPs has been used throughout Hungary.3 A similar system was developed for
Poland, and has been used in some areas of the country since 1996. These systems measure
program effectiveness in terms of the results achieved.4 They track gross program outcomes
such as reemployment rates and the average cost of achieving reemployment, using data from
follow-up mail surveys of program participants.
When program managers are encouraged to achieve a high employment rate for program
participants, a phenomenon called creaming frequently results.5 That is, program managers
might select mainly the most able applicants for participation. The result is high observed
reemployment rates, however many of the selected ALP participants may already possess the
skills and abilities to get reemployed themselves. By comparing their success to all unemployed,

3O'Leary (1995) described implementation of the system in Hungary and plans for use of
a similar system in Poland as a tool for managing ALPs.
4Auer (1996) documents the use of such systems for employment programs among
countries in the European Union. The OECD (1994) provided a guide on how to use such a
system for program management. The U.S. General Accounting Office (1998) provided a
constructive assessment of performance management systems used for employment programs in
the United States.
5The analogy is to milk where the richest part, the cream, floats to the top and can be
skimmed off. Creaming is an issue in operating labor market programs because if only the most
able people get reemployment assistance, then the benefit to society of the programs is not as
great as it might be otherwise. Highly qualified program entrants have a good chance of
becoming reemployed even without the services offered in the program, while for less qualified
applicants the program services might be the only realistic path to employment.

the positive impact on reemployment is high, but comparing their success to others with similar
characteristics the program impacts may be much smaller.
Program managers were warned about the social cost of creaming in program assignment
when the performance monitoring system was implemented in Hungary. They were encouraged
to target ALP services to the most difficult to reemploy.6 An earlier evaluation of retraining in
Hungary found evidence of creaming in program assignment (O'Leary, 1997). Attention is
given in this report to assessing the degree to which creaming is now being practiced.
Since they are widely recorded on a continuous basis, the performance indicators results
are useful for ongoing program management and planning. However, these indicators cannot
inform policy makers about any added value which may be provided by ALPs. For such net
impact analyses a comparison group design is needed. Net impact evaluations done from time to
time help policy makers decide which programs to expand, modify or delete as economic and
political conditions change. Such periodic evaluations are a necessary adjunct to performance
monitoring based management systems, and are useful in helping to set targets for program
performance.

An overview of employment policy
Employment policy in Hungary and Poland is carried out through administration of both
active and passive labor programs. In both countries local labor offices serve as one stop
shopping centers which provide an array of services to both job seekers and employers. In

6 O'Leary (1996) documented the risk of creaming in ALP performance management
systems, and measures to counteract creaming through targeting of services.

addition to providing placement services, local labor offices act as a unified clearing house for
referral to a variety of active and passive labor programs.
The main passive labor program in both countries is unemployment compensation (UC),
which is available for a limited duration to unemployed workers with sufficient recent work
1 experience. In Hungary UC had a wage replacement rate of between 50 and 75 percent of lost
wages depending on the duration of benefit receipt which has a maximum of 12 months.7
Hungary also provides unemployment assistance (UA) which is a means tested income support
program paying a uniform monthly stipend pegged to 80 percent of the lowest monthly public
retirement pension for a maximum of 24 months. Passive labor programs in Poland are limited
to UC, which is available for up to 12 months to unemployed workers with sufficient recent work
experience.8 The monthly UC benefit payment in Poland is uniformly 36 percent of the national
average wage for persons with between 5 and 20 years prior work experience. The benefit is 20
percent lower for those with under 5 years work history, and 20 percent higher for those having
worked more than 20 years. In Poland, after exhaustion of the UC benefit, there is only the
means-tested general assistance available from local government agencies.
As can be seen in Table 1, total spending on ALPs and unemployment compensation
(UC) in Hungary for 1996 amounted to nearly 77.2 billion Hungarian forints or around $454.1
million U.S. This level is about 1.03 percent of the Hungary's gross national product. In recent
years the share of employment program expenditures devoted to ALPs has ranged from 21.8 to

7Micklewright and Nagy (1998) examined the rules and operation of UC in Hungary. In
1998 there is now a uniform 65 percent wage replacement rate.
8G6ra and Schmidt (1998) explain the rules and effects of UC in Poland.

25.5 percent. The remainder of public spending for employment programs goes to passive labor
support through UC and UA. About a million people use Hungary's labor programs each year
with almost 30 percent of them participating in an ALP.
Total spending on ALPs and unemployment compensation (UC) for 1996 in Poland was
almost 7.5 billion Polish zloty, or around $2.5 billion U.S. That amount represented nearly
2.2 percent of the nation's gross domestic product. About 14 percent of employment program
expenditures have supported ALPs in recent years, with the balance spent on UC. About 3
million people per year use Poland's labor programs, with nearly a quarter of them participating
in an ALP.

ALPs evaluated in Hungary
Retraining in Hungary provides short term job skill training to promote readiness for job
vacancies in the region. Retraining candidates may be either unemployed, expected to be
unemployed, currently involved in PSE, or recent school graduates. Retraining participants
receive a stipend which is 10 percent more than their UC benefit. The direct costs of retraining
are also paid for by the local labor office. The evaluation reported on here focused on retraining
of the unemployed, initiated either by individuals or for groups of persons selected by local
labor offices. Our samples of participants include recent school graduates.
Public service employment (PSE) is a short term direct job creation program with
employment on projects organized by government agencies including municipal governments.
Participation in PSE may last no more than 12 months. Up to 70 percent of the direct
employment costs (including wages, work tools, working clothes, and transport) are subsidized
8

by the Employment Fund, provided that the employer does not receive any net income from
providing these items.
A wage subsidy program in Hungary is targeted toward people who are long term
unemployed. A wage subsidy of up to 50 percent is possible for up to one year. The payment is
made directly to the employer and applies to total labor costs for hiring persons who were;
previously unemployed for more than 6 months (3 months for school leavers), provided the
employer has not laid off anyone involved in the same line of work in the previous 6 months. If
workers hired through the subsidy are not retained after the subsidy ends for a period at least as
long as the subsidy was paid, the employer must repay the Employment Fund for all assistance
provided.
Self-employment assistance is provided to a small fraction of persons who are eligible for
unemployment compensation. The assistance operates like the British enterprise allowance
scheme which gives a series of periodic support payments.9 In Hungary monthly payments are
equal to the regular UC benefit, but may extend 6 months beyond the UC one year eligibility
period. Support may also include reimbursement of up to half the cost of professional
entrepreneurship counseling, and half the cost of training courses required for engaging in the
entrepreneurial activity. Up to half the premium on loan insurance for funds borrowed to start
the enterprise may be paid for one year.

9The British model is also used in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany. Elias and Whitfield (1987) studied the
impacts of the U.K. enterprise allowance scheme.

ALPs evaluated in Poland
In retraining, unemployed workers are given additional short-term job skill training to
make them ready to fill local job openings. Retraining participants receive a stipend which has a
15 percent premium over the UC benefit.
Public works is a short-term direct job creation program with employment on projects
organized by government agencies, including municipal governments. Stipends are set at 75
percent of the national average wage, which is more than double the 36 percent paid to UC
recipients. The wage level makes clear the main aim of public works which is income transfer.
Secondary aims of the program are to maintain job readiness skills of the unemployed and to
contribute to the public health and infrastructure.
Intervention works projects may not compete with private companies and the wage paid
by grants can be no more than the unemployment compensation benefit. Projects may be
operated by either public agencies or private companies. There may be no intervention works
contracts given to employers who have laid off significant numbers of workers in recent months.
There are also incentives for employers to permanently retain workers. After the end of an
intervention works project, which may last up to 6 months, employers can receive wage subsidies
up to 150 percent of the national average wage for up to 6 additional months for workers retained
after the first 6 months. Intervention works operates essentially as a wage subsidy program.
Self-employment assistance in Poland is something like the French lump sum model
except that repayment is required. 10 Assistance is provided to a select small fraction of registered

10The French model is also followed in Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and
Sweden.
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unemployed through a loan program. The maximum loan is rather small, with the size limit
being 20 times the national average wage. Loans are made at market rates of interest and must
be repaid immediately in full if the planned enterprise is not initiated. A strong incentive for
business survival is provided by a 50 percent reduction of the original principal amount granted
to businesses which survive at least two years.

Evaluation methodology
In terms of clearly guiding policy, simple unadjusted impact estimates are usually the
most influential because they are easy to understand. This is the main appeal of program
evaluation done ushig a classically designed experiment involving random assignment. 11 When
random assignment has been achieved, modeling of behaviour and complex econometric
methods are not needed to estimate reliable net program impacts. With large samples randomly
assigned to treatment and control groups, observable and unobservable characteristics of the two
groups should not differ on average so that any difference in outcomes may be attributed to
exposure to the program. Program impacts may be computed as the simple difference between
means of the samples of program participants and control group members on outcome measures
of interest.
When there is non-random assignment to either the ALP participant group or the
comparison group from the population of unemployed job seekers then statistical methods of

HFor examples of employment programs evaluated using a classically designed field
experiment see Decker and O'Leary (1995).
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correction must be used to reveal the net impacts of ALPs. 12 That is, proper estimation of
program net impacts involves correcting for possible selection bias which is present if persons
entering ALPs are on average different from comparison group members in their job skills and
aptitude. 13 In this study adjustments for selection bias are based on observable factors for which
data is available. 14
Recent surveys of microeconomic evaluations of ALPs done by Fay (1996) for
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries and by
Meager and Evans (1998) for a selected group of nations emphasize the importance of
accounting for deadweight loss and displacement effects in measuring program impacts. With a
mixed bag of findings which reveal net impacts of different ALPs vary widely by population
sub-group, both surveys argue that targeting of services is crucial to maximizing the social
dividend from public expenditure on employment programs.

12Such methods are sometimes called quasi-experimental because they attempt to
statistically mimic the ideal of a true experiment based on random trials (Fay, 1996).
13Program impacts reported in this report were estimated in models like the following:
Yi = ao + b,ALPj + b2ESj + b3ALPj *ES; + CXj + iij,
where ALP represents participation in an ALP, ES (employment service) represents use of ES
assistance, X represents a matrix of exogenous control variables, y is the outcome of interest, and
u is a normally distributed mean zero error term. After estimating an equation of this form by
ordinary least squares regression, the marginal effect of the ALP on y is estimated by the sum of
bj + b3 *E(ES), where E is the expectation operator and E(ES) is the mean of the variable ES or
the proportion of the sample which used the ES.
14The obvious next step to adjust for differences across samples is to account for
differences in unobservable characteristics using the methods of Heckman (1976). An effort to
do this failed essentially because no instruments were available which explained program
participation independent of reemployment success.
12

When an unemployed person participates in an ALP which does not improve their chance
of reemployment there is a deadweight loss to society for the spending. 15 When an ALP
participant gains reemployment at the direct expense of an otherwise similar job seeker then
displacement has occurred. When an employer, either government or private, receives a subsidy
to hire a worker who would have otherwise been hired anyway then substitution of ALP
financing for other intended spending has occurred. 16
It is crucial to account for displacement and substitution effects when doing social
benefit-cost assessments of public programs. However, these factors are irrelevant at the
individual level and very difficult to measure at the social level. The investigation summarized
here focused on net impacts of ALPs, and the comparison group design automatically accounts
for possible deadweight loss by comparing ALP participants to otherwise similar nonparticipants. A subgroup analysis of net impacts provides a basis for targeting ALPs.

Sampling considerations
Sample sizes were set to ensure precision based on considerations of power tests for
observing effects of a size that would be of interest to policy makers. That is, the samples were
set to be large enough to reject the null hypothesis of no effect with sufficient power to accept the
alternative that an intervention is efficacious. Furthermore, the sample sizes were set large

15If a program manager practices creaming in selecting participants for ALPs, then a
deadweight loss results.
16Johnson and Tomola (1977) provide a clear example of how to estimate the
employment effects of fiscal substitution in direct job creation programs. They maintain that the
degree of substitution increases as a program matures.
13

enough to provide reliable estimates of differential program effects on important demographic
and regional sub-groups. The main program outcome guiding sample size determination was the
proportion employed on the survey date, and samples sizes were set large enough to detect
program impacts of 5 percentage points or more where the difference is measured from 50
percent. 17
Samples were drawn from among those registered as unemployed. This is the relevant
population from which to sample when evaluating public reemployment efforts. All recipients of
income support and reemployment assistance from the system of labor offices must be registered
as unemployed and seeking work. This sampling frame includes a broad cross-section of all
unemployed job seekers since private employment agencies serve a very small segment of the
labor market in these countries.

Samples for the evaluation in Hungary

The sample for analysis in Hungary was drawn from randomly selected samples in a
strategically selected group of 10 counties: Budapest (the capital city), Baranya, Bekes, Borsod,
17Testing the difference between proportions is somewhat complicated by the fact that the
sample sizes required for properly testing a given difference between proportions varies
depending on whether the proportions are near zero or one (Cohen, 1988, pp. 179-213).
Specifically, the required sample sizes for testing the difference in proportions with adequate
power depend on the effect size, h, which is the difference in the arcsin transformation of the
proportions. That is, f(p) = 2arcsin p and the effect size is h = abs(f(pp) - f(pc)) for nondirectional tests where pp is the proportion employed among the ALP participant group and pc is
the proportion employed among the comparison group. For tests of abs(pp - pc) = 0.05 when pp
is around 0.5 then h = 0.1. To perform two tailed tests at the confidence level of 98 percent with
a power of 80 percent and h = 0.1 the harmonic mean of the sample sizes should be at least 2,007
in size, where the harmonic mean, n', of the samples sizes is n1 = 2npnc/(np + r^). Lowering the
confidence level to 90 percent lowers the sample size requirement to 1,237. When pp is closer to
either 0 or 1 the sample size requirements for similar tests [abs(pp - pc) = 0.05] are smaller.
14

Csongrad, Fejer, Hajdu-Bihar, Pest, Szabolcs, and Vas. 18 In 1996 these counties spanned the
range of economic conditions. Three counties enjoyed an unemployment rate below 8 percent,
three suffered unemployment rates in excess of 15 percent, and four had moderate
unemployment rates. Together the counties surveyed in Hungary comprise nearly two-thirds of
the nation's population. Compared to the nation as a whole these counties have a somewhat
smaller proportion of employment in agriculture, a higher population density, a lower
unemployment rate, and higher mean monthly wages. Among these counties, some have
experienced steady labor market improvement since the peak of national unemployment in early
1993, while others have stagnated.
Administration of the surveys in Hungary was managed by experts in the National Labor
Center. Surveys were conducted in March and April 1997 through house-to-house visits by staff
of local labor offices during their off-work hours. 19 Program participant groups were drawn from
the outflow of program participation occurring in the second quarter of 1996. There was random
sampling from the outflow where sample sizes were large enough, with random draws made by
birth date. For self-employment which had a small number of participants, an attempt was made
to contact the full population of all those who participated during the first three quarters of 1996.
The comparison group was randomly selected, using birth dates, in the 10 counties from the

18 The sub-national provincial divisions in Hungary are called counties and in Poland are
called voivods.
19Some interviews were conducted during regular visits by the unemployed to labor
offices. This survey process means ALP impact estimates on reemployment rates may be biased
downward since the unemployed are more likely to visit labor offices, and the employed are less
likely to be available at home during house-to-house visits.
15

inflow to the register during the second quarter of 1995. That was judged to be about the time
that most people drawn for the participant samples had themselves registered as unemployed.
Table 2 contrasts the comparison group and the ALP samples from Hungary using
categorical indicators of sample characteristics. Sample sizes are provided in the bottom row.20
In this table asterisks indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the«
comparison group and the ALP group on the characteristic. A quick glance at the table reveals
that a large proportion of the differences are statistically significant. Indeed many more than 10
percent of the differences are statistically significant, which is the proportion that would be
expected if the samples were all drawn from the same population and tests at the 90 percent
confidence level were applied.
In contrast to the comparison group which was randomly drawn from the unemployment
register; the individual retraining sample is more female, younger, and more educated; the group
retraining sample is also more female, younger, and more educated; the PSE sample is more
male, younger, and less educated; the wage subsidy sample is somewhat more educated; and the
self-employment sample is more male, closer on average to prime working age, and more
educated.
The wide ranging differences in sample composition suggest that there was non-random
assignment of participants to ALPs. This means that ALP net impact estimates must be
computed while controlling for systematic sample selection. In this report correction in

20In Hungary the survey response rate among ALP participants was 81.4 percent, while
that for the comparison group was 75.6 percent.
16

estimation is limited to adjustments based on observable characteristics.21 The estimation
methodology used and the comparison group design purges the net impact estimates from the
effects of any creaming practiced by program administrators.22

Samples for the evaluation in Poland

:

Data for evaluating ALPs in Poland was gathered by surveys of randomly selected
participant samples and strategically selected comparison samples in a group of eight voivods:
Gorzow, Katowice, Konin, Krakow, Lublin, Olsztyn, Poznan, and Radom. While these locations
were chosen partly because of information processing similarities, they nonetheless span the
range of labor market experience in Poland during the transition to markets.23 Among the eight
voivods surveyed, four are among Poland's most populous: Katowice, Krakow, Lublin, and
Poznan. The eight encompass over one-quarter of the population of Poland, including several
large cities, yielding a higher than average population density. These areas also have
unemployment rates much lower, wages somewhat higher, and a smaller share of agriculture than
the nation as a whole.

21 O'Leary (1998a, 1998b) presents impact estimates computed by matched pairs and a
variety of regression methods. The various net impact estimation methods yielded estimates
which were not significantly different from one another. The estimates presented in this report
were all computed using an ordinary least squares regression model which controls for
observable characteristics and for use of particular ES assistance.
22When creaming is practiced, gross impact estimates which compare participant success
to all unemployed yield positive impacts on reemployment, while net impact estimates which
compare participant success to others having similar characteristics would yield much smaller
program impacts.
23A dozen different local labor office computer systems were in use around Poland at the
time of the survey. Two different systems were involved in the eight voivods surveyed.
17

Surveys were conducted in 80 local areas between February 15 and April 15, 1997.
Administration of the questionnaires was managed by experts in the voivod labor offices and
conducted by staff of local labor offices. Some interviews were done during regular visits to
labor offices by subjects who had previously been selected, other interviews were done during
house-to-house visits. The overall survey response rate was 92.6 percent.
ALP entry during the whole of 1995 was taken as the sampling frame for participants in
retraining, public works, and intervention works. Random sampling of participants was done by
birth date. Since a longer period is required to assess the effects of self-employment assistance,
loan receipt during 1993 and 1994 was taken as the sampling frame. The small numbers
involved meant that instead of random sampling from self-employment participants, an attempt
was made to contact the whole population of assistance recipients. For other programs, sample
sizes for each voivod were set to be in proportion to the voivod share of program participants.
After the participant samples were selected, the observable exogenous characteristics of the
groups selected were examined. The comparison group samples were drawn from the population
of registered unemployed by matching persons in each of the ALP participant samples to the
most similar person from the unemployment register of the same local labor office. Separate
comparison group samples for each program were selected from among those who registered as
unemployed within the same time period and never participated in an active labor program.
Table 3 shows that in contrast to a random sample of registered unemployed the
retraining group is less male, younger, more educated, less likely to be in a blue collar
occupation, and more likely to be long term unemployed; the public works group is more male,
younger, and less educated; the intervention works group is more female, younger, less likely to
18

be in a blue collar occupation, and more likely to be long term unemployed; and the selfemployment group is more male, more likely to be of prime working age, more likely to be of
prime working age, more likely to be vocationally educated, and slightly less likely to be long
term unemployed. Sizes for ALP participant samples are listed in Table 3.24

Net impact estimates
Net impact estimates of ALP effects were computed for Hungary and Poland on
employment, earnings, and unemployment compensation outcome measures. To provide an
overview of the findings estimates on five different outcome measures are presented in Table 4:25

EMPLOYED - Ever reemployed in a non-subsidized job or self-employment
EMPLNOW - Employed in a non-subsidized job or self-employment on the survey date
EARNNOW - Average monthly earnings on the current job on the survey date
UCMONTHS - Months of UC collected
UCPAY - Amount of UC collected
24The matched pairs comparison group sample sizes are: 2,885 for retraining, 1,174 for
public works, 2,410 for intervention works, and 700 for self-employment. Contrasting these with
the participant samples on observable characteristics revealed the strategically selected
comparison samples to be well matched to the participant samples. The matched comparison
samples are therefore ideal for computing net impacts while controlling for non-random
participant selection into ALPs.
"Complete results are reported in O'Leary (199 8 a, 1998b). The ALP net impact
estimates reported here were computed in ES interaction models by ordinary least squares.
These are linear probability models with well known deficiencies when the dependent variable is
binary as are EMPLOYED and EMPLNOW. Since the mean values of these outcomes are far
from the extremes of 0 and 1, the non-linear method of logit did not result in significantly
different marginal effect estimates. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991, p. 260) explain this result.
19

Net impact estimates are examined for the following four classes of programs: retraining,
public works, wage subsidies, and self-employment. The discussion of each program includes
review of subgroup estimates which are reported in Table 5 for Hungary and Table 6 for Poland,
and findings concerning the influence of different aspects of ALPs as summarized in Table 7 for
Hungary and Table 8 for Poland.

Retraining
For Hungary it was possible to separately analyze the net impacts of individual and group
retraining. Individual retraining resulted in 11 percentage points more people getting back into a
non-subsidized job or self-employment, and 9 percentage points more being in such a job on the
survey date.26 The fact of continued employment through the survey date suggests that the effect
of retraining is somewhat durable. There was no significant impact on average monthly earnings
in the job held on the survey date. Participation hi individual retraining was estimated to reduce
UC receipt by 0.68 months and decrease payments by $43.27 As seen in Table 5, there were no
distinct differences by gender, age education or occupation group. While not significantly
26O'Leary (1998a) reports that the unadjusted impact estimates are very close to the
adjusted results for individual retraining in Hungary. This is at odds with results from studies
based on samples drawn in 1992 and 1993 where the unadjusted impact estimates were far larger
than the estimates adjusted for observable characteristics (O'Leary, 1997). The convergence in
estimates could be due to changed labor demand conditions in Hungary, or because ALP
managers have retreated from their practice of creaming in retraining enrollment.
27Unemployment compensation payments are considered since the beginning of 1996.
All monetary values are stated in U.S. dollars converted at the average daily exchange rate on
April 1, 1997. This results in a reasonably accurate value for average monthly earnings reported
in the first part of 1997, however since both the Hungarian and Polish currencies gradually fell in
value compared to the U.S. dollar the conversion rule underestimates the monetary values
involved.
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different from the complementary group, the impact on employment was larger for those who
personally contributed to the direct cost of individual retraining, for those in retraining 3 months
or less, and for courses meeting 20 or fewer hours per week.
Group retraining in Hungary resulted in 9 percentage points more people getting into a
non-subsidized job or self-employment, and 7 percentage points more people being in regular
non-subsidized employment on the survey date.28 There was no significant impact on earnings in
the job held on the survey date. Participation in group retraining was estimated to reduce UC
receipt by 0.50 months and decrease payments by $27 on average per participant. For group
training there were no distinct differences by gender, age, education, or occupational group. The
impact on employment appeared larger for those who personally contributed to the direct costs of
group training. Group retraining between 3 and 12 months duration, or conducted outside of the
regional retraining centers improved employment rates by a statistically significant margin over
the complementary groups.29
Retraining in Poland resulted in 12 percentage points more people getting into regular
non-subsidized employment or self employment, and the same percentage point advantage when
measured at the survey date. Retraining also produced a $7 gain in average monthly earnings.
Table 6 reports that retraining was most effective for those who were not long term unemployed
28The net impact estimates reported here which are based on a regression model with ES
interaction and are positive and much larger than the unadjusted impact estimates reported in
O'Leary (1998a). Like for individual retraining in Hungary this result is at odds with earlier
findings for Hungary (O'Leary, 1997), and suggests reverse creaming or proper targeting of
group retraining to raise the social dividend of public spending.
29In Hungary there is a network often regional retraining centers which were established
under a World Bank loan. Retraining is also provided by private firms and educational
institutions under contract with the county labor centers.
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and those with the least prior work experience. It was also more effective in areas with relatively
high unemployment. There was no difference in retraining impact by gender, age, education or
major occupational group. As summarized in Table 8, short-term skill focused retraining was
found to be most effective, and there was some evidence that retraining provided by private firms
was more effective. It is better if retraining is provided by an adult education?or other firm
engaged in normal industrial activity rather than having training provided by an employment
organization or having another labor-related group serve as the trainer.

Public works
In Hungary the direct job creation program is PSE. Participation in PSE resulted in a 26
percentage point decline in the proportion getting reemployed in a non-subsidized job or selfemployment, and a 21 percentage point decline in being in such a job on the survey date.30 The
net impact on average monthly earnings was $9, but this point estimate was not statistically
significant. The impacts of PSE on receipt of UC were also not statistically significant being
-0.19 months and -$9. These negative impacts are more severe than expected based on prior
evidence about PSE in Hungary.31 A subgroup analysis indicated that PSE participation harmed
reemployment chances less for women, less for those aged 45 or more, and less for the most
30The regression adjusted net impact estimates indicate that PSE has an even more
detrimental effect on reemployment prospects than suggested by the unadjusted impact estimates
(O'Leary, 1998a). This result is at odds with earlier findings that unadjusted and adjusted impact
estimates are very similar for PSE in Hungary (O'Leary, 1997). The new results suggest that
many of the PSE participants were job ready at the time of program entry. This probably reflects
changed labor demand conditions for low skilled workers more than any change in PSE referral
practices by program managers.
31As reported by O'Leary (1997).
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educated. PSE work which requires manual unskilled labor appears to create the greatest
hindrance to future employment in a regular non-subsidized job or self employment, while nonmanual and skilled manual work provides the least impediment. There is no significant
difference by the industry of activity, but service employment appears to be less detrimental in
promoting reintegration to the regular work force than employment in other industries.
Public works in Poland had much smaller negative net impacts on reemployment than did
PSE in Hungary. Public works resulted in a 4 percentage point decline in the proportion who
were in a non-subsidized job or self-employment on the survey date, and an 8 percentage point
decline in ever getting into such a job. Public works participation did not have a statistically
significant effect on average monthly earnings. Participation did raise the average duration of
UC receipt by 0.93 months during the period observed and did increase UC payments by $103.
The subgroup analysis of public works impact on reemployment revealed no significant
differences across subgroups. However, the results suggested that public works is less
detrimental for women, may actually improve employment prospects for older workers, least
hinder reemployment for those with less than eight years of formal schooling, might benefit
those whose previous experience was in a white collar occupation, and may not harm those who
were not long-term unemployed. There was some evidence that short-term public works
hindered future labor market success less thari did a longer term involvement, and strong
evidence that public works provided by private firms was more effective. It is better for
promoting reemployment if public works is provided by a group other than an agency of the
national government.
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Wage subsidies
The wage subsidy for long term unemployed in Hungary is estimated to have negative net
impacts on reemployment, lowering the proportion getting into a non-subsidized job or selfemployment by 11 percentage points, and reduced the proportion in such a position on the survey
date by 6 percentage points.32 A subgroup analysis indicated that the wage subsidy benefitted
employment most among those in areas with moderate unemployment. The subgroup results
also suggest that wage subsidy impacts did not vary appreciably by gender, age, or prior
occupational group. The skill level of the wage subsidy job had no significant effect on the
employment outcome. Among industries where wage subsidies were used, in terms of being in a
non-subsidized job or self-employment on the survey date, participants were most harmed by
subsidized jobs in construction or services.
As described above, intervention works in Poland operates much like a wage subsidy
scheme. However, the net impact estimates for this program are substantially different from
those for the wage subsidy in Hungary which is targeted to long term unemployed. The
intervention works program is estimated to increase the probability of being in a normal job on
the survey date by 24 percentage points, and of ever finding a normal job by 26 percentage
points. The program did not have a statistically significant effect on average monthly earnings.
A subgroup analysis of intervention works revealed significantly larger employment gains for
32For the wage subsidy in Hungary, controlling for observable characteristics and the use
of the ES was important in estimating net impacts. There is strong evidence that employers were
quite selective in choosing the best candidates for wage subsidies. The unadjusted impact
estimates were large and positive (O'Leary, 1998a). Together with the negative and significant
net impact estimates, this suggests that many workers whose wages were subsidized could have
gained reemployment without public subsidy. This may be due to intentional creaming by either
employers or program managers. The deadweight loss is sizeable.
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females, those with less than some higher education, those who are not long-term unemployed,
and those without prior work experience. The program also has a tendency to be of more benefit
to older workers. Subsidized jobs under intervention works frequently last either 6 or 12 months.
The optimal duration appears to be 6 months, with shorter rather than longer duration
involvement more favorable to reemployment in a regular non-subsidized job or selfemployment. It also appears that having worked on an intervention works job outside the
national government boosts the reemployment in a non-subsidized job or self-employment more.
The best industry observed was health care.

Self-employment
Self-employment assistance in Hungary raised the probability of getting into a nonsubsidized job or self-employment by 14 percentage points, and raised the chance of being in
such a position on the survey date by 14 percentage points.33 It should be noted that assistance to
the self employed in the participant sample ended during or before the third quarter of 1996.
Since the survey was conducted in the first quarter of 1997, the follow-up observation occurred
33The employment outcome for participant and comparison group samples included both
a non-subsidized job and non-subsidized self employment. Restricting the comparison group
outcome to only self-employment yielded comparison groups too small, and including any nonsubsidized employment is a reasonable broadening for self-employment assistance recipients.
The net impact estimates presented are from regression models with ES interaction.
Deleting the ES interaction in estimation yields nearly the same point estimates, but much lower
standard errors and a high degree of statistical significance since few in the sample used the ES.
The estimates given in Table 4 for these parameters may be regarded as statistically significant.
The unadjusted impact estimates were significantly larger than the adjusted estimates
reported here, suggesting that many of those provided self-employment assistance would have
gained reemployment without the assistance. As Wandner (1992) points out in a cross-country
survey of European self-employment, only a small share of the unemployed are deemed capable
of such an undertaking. Therefore creaming may be inherent in any self-employment program.
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relatively soon to fairly judge business survival. 34 The net impact on average monthly earnings
was -$26. This large negative impact on earnings may reflect a reluctance for full disclosure to
public authorities as part of a tax avoidance strategy. There also was a large reduction in
measured UC duration and payments. However, this could simply be an artifact of the selfemployment program which essentially relabels UC and extends payments by 6 months. A clear
benefit of self-employment was that 17.6 percent of those receiving assistance hired at least one
other worker for their enterprise. Indeed one successful recipient claims to have hired 12
workers. The mean number of workers employed by those who did hire someone was 1.75
employees, and the mean hired among all assistance recipients was 0.31. Furthermore, about
half of all those hired were previously unemployed. The net impact on average monthly earnings
was -$26. A sub-group analysis indicated that self-employment assistance boosted
reemployment rates most among those 45 years of age and older, and those in high
unemployment areas. Among industries the least fertile place for self-employment yielding
lasting effects was services. There was not a significant difference in employment outcomes for
those who started individual versus partnership activities.
Self-employment in Poland is estimated to increase the probability of getting into a nonsubsidized job or non-subsidized self-employment by 29 percentage points and to raise the
chance of being in such a job on the survey date by 27 percentage points. Those moving into
self-employment reported dramatic gains in average monthly earnings which amounted to $69,
and also dramatic reductions in the duration and amount of UC benefits drawn. Self34For small business start-ups in the United States, Birch (1987, p. 18) estimated that "For
every group of companies that open their doors, approximately half will last five years, 38
percent will be around after ten years, and 31 percent will survive 15 years."
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employment loan recipients drew less in UC benefits by a staggering 3.65 months and $258.
Among those receiving a self-employment loan 26.7 percent hired at least one other worker. One
loan recipient reported hiring 73 workers. The mean number of workers hired by those who did
employ someone was 3.13 employees. The mean hired among all loan recipients was 0.83
employees. Self-employment provided a particular reemployment advantage for females, those
whose previous experience was in a blue-collar occupation, those with no prior registered
unemployment, and those with a positive but small amount of prior work experience. In terms of
positive reemployment outcomes the worst type of enterprise to initiate with self-employment
assistance appears to have been manufacturing or construction. Like in Hungary, it must be
remembered that the period for observing reemployment success of the self-employed in Poland
is relatively short. The sample in Poland includes those who received loans in 1993 and 1994.
Since the program provides a 50 percent loan forgiveness after 24 months survival, that is 24
months with no UC benefit, and the follow-up survey was done in early 1997 some loan
recipients had only just passed their loan forgiveness date when interviewed. This program
design feature most certainly affected results during the period of observation in Poland.

Summary

To evaluate the effectiveness of active labor programs (ALPs) in Hungary and Poland
more than 27,000 follow-up interviews were conducted in early 1997 by employees of local
labor offices with persons in ALP participant and comparison group samples. Net impact
estimates revealed what can be expected from each of the alternative interventions in terms of
employment, earnings, and savings on unemployment compensation payments. Four types of
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ALP were examined: retraining, public works, wage subsidies, and self-employment assistance.
The evaluation was mainly financed by the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of International
Labor Affairs, the European Training Foundation, and the W. E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research. In kind contributions were provided by the national labor offices in
Hungary and Poland. The project was coordinated by the World Bank. The national labor
organizations of Hungary and Poland collaborated fully in producing the impact estimates, and in
the process acquired skills which will permit future scientific evaluation of employment
programs.
Wide ranging differences were observed between the demographic composition ALP
samples and the general population of unemployed. Program effects were therefore computed as
net impact estimates controlling for systematic sample selection using observable characteristics
including information on job search assistance from the employment service. The net impact
estimation procedure eliminated any deadweight loss when measuring results from ALP
participation.
Retraining was found to significantly increase the reemployment rate in both Hungary
and Poland. Return to a non-subsidized job or self-employment increased by a net 9 to 12
percentage points among retraining participants. Focused short term skill training delivered by
private contractors appeared to be most effective. Retraining did not provide a particular
advantage in getting the long term unemployed back to work. Earlier evaluations found evidence
that creaming, whereby mostly the job ready are selected for participation, was generally
practiced by retraining managers in Hungary. Creaming is costly to society because ALP
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resources are spent on people who could get reemployed without government assistance. The
present evaluation found no evidence that managers of retraining practice creaming.
Public works is not intended to rapidly reintegrate unemployed back into non-subsidized
jobs. The main aims are income transfer, arresting the deterioration of work place behaviors, and
some contribution to social services or public infrastructure. It is not surprising that negative net
impacts on reemployment in non-subsidized work were found. Nonetheless some findings based
on the reemployment outcome have been useful in shaping policy. Publicly created jobs
appeared to be much more of a detriment to getting reemployed in a non-subsidized job in
Hungary (-26 percentage points) than in Poland (-8 percentage points). The population sub
groups in Hungary who were least hindered by such a temporary job were recent school leavers
and those forced out of their earlier job. In Poland, public works least harmed reemployment in a
non-subsidized job among older workers, those with a general secondary education, and those in
low unemployment areas. Most importantly in Poland there was a large positive impact on
getting into a non-subsidized job (10 percentage points) when the project was run by a private
company, while the impact was negative (-5 percentage points) when run by a government
agency.35 This last result has been particularly influential in reshaping the management of
public works in Poland. Private management of projects also reduces the chance of fiscal
substitution whereby government agencies finance regular staff positions with Labor Fund
money.
35This finding is consistent with those of Disney and Carruth (1992) who reported that in
Germany and the U.K. the transition to regular employment was more likely to be made by
public works employees if their project was run by a private enterprise rather than a government
agency.
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Wage subsidies in Hungary are targeted toward long term unemployed and were found to
be detrimental to reemployment, lowering the proportion in non-subsidized jobs on the survey
date by 6 percentage points. Furthermore, combined with the large positive unadjusted impact
estimates this suggests that many participants could have gained reemployment without public
subsidy. So that the deadweight loss for the wage subsidy in Hungary is sizeable. On the other
hand the wage-subsidy-like program in Poland, intervention works which is mainly operated by
private contractors, raised the proportion in non-subsidized jobs on the survey date by 24
percentage points. The commonality of response in Poland between intervention works and
public works run by private companies is notable. Also significant is the large reductions in the
duration and amount of unemployment compensation (UC) which result from intervention works
participation in Poland. These many positive outcomes make programs like intervention works a
particularly appealing reemployment program.
Self-employment yielded the most favorable set of impacts of the four ALPs in both
countries. However, many of those receiving self-employment assistance probably would have
gained reemployment without government assistance. UC savings were the biggest by a large
margin, and impacts on employment outcomes were large and positive. In Poland there were
also large and positive earnings impacts. A negative estimated earnings impact in Hungary may
have been due to a reluctance for full disclosure to tax authorities. In both countries there were
appreciable secondary employment effects of between 0.31 and 0.83 additional workers per
person given self-employment assistance. Among subgroups self-employment appeared to be
more effective in high unemployment areas in Hungary, among females in Poland, outside of
services industries in Hungary, and outside of manufacturing and construction in Poland.
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Conclusion
The collection of active and passive labor programs in place in Hungary and Poland to
support the development of competitive labor markets is impressive. This report presents a net
impact analysis of four important active labor programs (ALPs) in each of the countries:
retraining, public works, wage subsidies, and self-employment. These programs are
administered in a decentralized way by the provinces which adhere to rules established by
national law with funding provided mainly from the central government budget. They are
discretionary programs and therefore subject to dramatic year-to-year changes in funding. Other
active labor programs are operated in both Hungary and Poland on a centralized basis. Usage of
these supplementary measures, which mainly address problems in high unemployment areas,
fluctuate more widely over time.
The evidence presented in this report is useful for developing an economic justification
for public expenditure on ALPs. However the decision to pursue programs for labor market
support also has a political dimension. During a period of dramatic change in conditions of
employment security, such programs are more imperative than option. The rules for return on
investment cannot be simply applied to such matters. Social stability is a difficult value to
quantify.
In assessing the net benefits of an ALP it is important to be clear about the perspective
taken. Things may be judged from social, government, program, and individual views. It is
impossible to properly measure all factors which bear on such computations, these include things
like the value of projects completed under public works and the value of time spent in retraining.
Nonetheless, the main elements for such computations can be measured. A summary of these are
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presented in Table 9. The first three columns repeat information from Table 4 on employment
earnings, and unemployment compensation payment. The last column lists the per participant
cost for providing each program in 1996.
It is unlikely that any of the ALPs yields a positive return on investment during the period
of observation. Indeed the alternatives should be examined to determine which are the least
costly for returning the unemployed to work. Skill retraining for the unemployed as
administered in Hungary and Poland appears to be a good bargain, and the evidence is that these
programs are well targeted to yield a high social value. Public works is not generally a path back
to non-subsidized work, somehow though spending more per participant and operation by private
employers appears to be an advantage. The wage subsidies targeted to the long term unemployed
are costly and yield no easily measurable benefits, while more generally provided wage subsidies
for jobs at private employers offer real benefits albeit at higher costs. Finally, self-employment
assistance while appropriate for only a small share of all unemployed, does provide a realistic
prospect of reemployment for some.
Aside from the net impacts, ALPs have a direct effect of easing the labour market
tensions because of the simple fact that those who are participating in ALPs are not counted as
unemployed during their participation. In Hungary during the past few years such participation
has reduced measured unemployment by 2 percentage points below what it would be otherwise.
Furthermore, while ALP participation does not always immediately result in stable
reemployment, for individual program participants the experience is at a minimum an
interruption in an otherwise continuous spell of unemployment.
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The kind of mixed net impact assessment reported here is common for active labour
programmes, and should be expected given the range of difficulties involved. In times when
unemployment is high and the demand for labour is low as currently in transition countries,
uniformly high net impacts from ALPs would be suspect. The range of results found highlights
the importance of carefully assessing active labour programmes so that public funds .can be
utilized as efficiently as possible while pursuing the social goal of returning the unemployed to
gainful work.
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Table 1. The unemployment rate and employment programme spending on active and passive labour
programmes in Hungary and Poland, 1990-96
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

: Hungary
Unemployment rate (%)
Price index (previous year = 100)

0.9

4.1

10.4

13.4

12.1

11.2

11.2

128.9

135.0

123.0

122.5

118.8

128.2

123.6

Spending on ALPs1 and PLPs2 (million
forints)

7,640

28,654

77,208

90,419

69,889

64,174

77,157

Share of spending on ALPs 1
Retraining
PSE
Wage subsidies
Self-employment
Other ALPs1

0.648
0.108
0.051

0.489

0.269
0.043
0.019
0.000
0.001
0.206

0.169
0.053
0.021
0.004
0.003
0.088

0.180
0.073
0.034
0.016
0.006
0.052

0.255
0.107
0.064
0.034
0.008
0.042

0.233
0.102
0.068
0.033
0.003
0.027

0.218
0.069
0.087
0.025
0.003
0.033

Share of spending on PLPs2

0.352

0.731

0.831

0.820

0.745

0.767

0.782

;*aiPo1an'd"vr
^K::,.....:s.w...i

Unemployment rate (%)
Price index (previous year = 100)

SIfi:%i?S ,"

', .:'4*:'.:.

I

6.3

11.8

13.6

16.4

16.0

14.9

13.6

585.8

70.3

43.0

35.3

32.2

27.8

19.9

370

1,358

2,283

3,190

4,447

6,207

7,418

Share of spending on ALPs 1
Retraining
Public works
Intervention works
Self-employment loans
Loans to employers
Other ALPs1

0.489
0.004

0.180
0.007

0.056

0.033

0.137
0.008
0.008
0.021

0.161
0.014
0.038
0.043

0.260
0.169

0.030
0.110

0.010
0.090

0.017
0.050

0.162
0.013
0.047
0.055
0.008
0.005
0.035

0.147
0.010
0.041
0.050
0.007
0.004
0.034

0.132
0.012
0.032
0.037
0.008
0.003
0.039

Share of spending on UC3

0.511

0.820

0.863

0.839

0.838

0.853

0.868

Spending on ALPs1 and UC3 (million
zloty)

1 Active labour programmes; 2 Passive labour programmes; 3 Unemployment compensation.
Sources: National Labour Centre, Budapest, and National Labour Office, Warsaw
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Table 2. Composition of the ALP samples contrasted with that of the comparison group, in Hungary____

Male respondent
Aged s 30
Aged 3 1-44
Aged 45+
8 years of schooling
Vocational education
General secondary education
Some higher education
Blue-collar occupation

comparison Individual
Group Public service Wage
Selfgroup
retraining retraining employment subsidies employment
0.476**
0.490**
0.619**
0.665** 0.561
0.555
0.649**
0.662**
0.260**
0.329** 0.407
0.415
0.277**
0.267**
0.544**
0.394
0.399
0.383
0.074**
0.071**
0.277** 0.194
0.201
0.196
0.246**
0.164**
0.468** 0.264**
0.078**
0.345
0.244**
0.295**
0.303** 0.425
0.412
0.388
0.453**
0.478**
0.427**
0.197
0.269**
0.213
0.057**
0.063**
0.107**
0.032
0.042*
0.030
0.623**
0.604**
0.627**
0.819
0.814
0.771**

Long-term unemployed

0.218

0.180**

Sample size

3214

1150

0.213
1254

0.483**

0.299**

1088

1091

* Difference from the full comparison group is statistically significant at the 90 per cent level in a two-tailed test.
** Difference from the full comparison group is statistically significant at the 95 per cent level in a two-tailed test.
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0.052**
1044

Table 3. Composition of the ALP samples contrasted with that of a random sample of registered unemployed,
in Poland
Random
SelfIntervention
sample of
Retraining
Public works
works
unemployed
employment
0.853**
0.408**
0.327**
0.511
Male respondent
0.577^
Aged < 30
Aged 30-44
Aged 45+

0.552
0.328
0.121

0.893**
0.098**
0.009**

0.604**
0.319**
0.077**

0.892**
0.093**
0.015**

0.331**
0.570**
0.099**

8 years of schooling
Vocational education
General secondary education
Some higher education

0.256
0.623
0.092
0.028

0.409**
0.560**
0.019**
0.013**

0.087**
0.840**
0.058**
0.015**

0.103**
0.810**
0.054**
0.033**

Blue-collar occupation

0.465

0.035**
0.708**
0.228**
0.028
0.173**

0.723**

0.313**

0.516**

Lost previous job

0.808

0.922**

0.825**

0.916**

0.756**

Long-term unemployed

0.338

0.522**

0.533**

0.514**

0.290**

Sample size

10,000

2,885

1,174

2,410

700

Difference from the random sample of unemployed is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test.
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Table 4. Net impact of ALPs on employment, earnings, and unemployment compensation, in Hungary and
Poland____________________________________________________________
EMPLOYED 1 EMPLNOW2 EARNNOW3 UCMONTHS4
UCPAY5

Individual retraining
Group retraining
Public service employment
Wage subsidy
Self-employment

0.11**
0.09**
-0.26**
-0.11**
0.14

0.09**
0.07**
-0.21**
-0.06**

Retraining
Public works
Intervention works
Self-employment

0.12**
-0.08**
0.26**
0.29**

0.12**
-0.04**
0.24**
0.27**

0.16

7
5**
9**
-6
-26

-0.68**
-0.50**
-0.19
0.04**
-1.64**

-43**
-27**
-9**
7
-120

7**

1.14**
0.93**
-2.26**
-3.65**

94**
103**
-178**
-258**

-5**
1
69

** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent level in a two-tailed test
1 Ever re-employed in an unsubsidized job or in self-employment
2 Employed in an unsubsidized job or in self-employment on the survey date
3 Average monthly earnings from the current job on the survey date (US$)
4 Months of unemployment compensation collected since January 1996
5 Amount of unemployment compensation collected since January 1996, in US$ at exchange rate of US$1.00 = 175.75 Hungarian forints or
3.068 Polish zloty, on 1 April 1997, approximately the survey date_______________________________________
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Table 5. Estimates of net impact of ALPs by subgroup on whether participants were employed in an
unsubsidized job or in self-employment on the survey date, in Hungary
Public
Individual
service
Group
Wage
Selfretraining
retraining employment subsidy employment
-0.138**## 0.037
0.339**
Male respondent
-0.021
0.086**
0.076**
0.344**
Female respondent-0.042
0.087**
0.023
-0.111**
0.339**
Aged < 30
0.008
0.081**
0.029
0.059*
-0.112**
Aged 30-44
0.018
0.076**
0.320**#
0.098**
0.389**
Aged45+~
-0.048
-0.067
0.126**
0.089**
0.030
0.065
-0.049

0.377**
0.330**
0.332**
0.273**

-0.037
0.011

-0.141**#
-0.090**
-0.057
0.068
-0.116**
-0.094**

0.059
0.053**

0.325**
0.346**

0.084**
0.087**

-0.041
0.010

-0.089**
-0.101**

0.084**
0.045*

0.364**
0.336**

0.066* *
0.087**
0. 102**

0.016
-0.015
0.002

-0.129**
-0.093**
-0.082**

0.036
0.113**##
0.012

0.336**
0.288**##
0.394**

8 years of schooling
Vocational education
General secondary education
Some higher education-

0.086**
0. 1 0 1 * *
0.066**
0.098

0.001
-0.002
-0.011
0.084

White-collar occupation
Blue-collar occupation~

0.05 1
0.098**

Long-term unemployed
Not in long-term unemploymentArea of low unemployment
Area of medium unemployment
Area of high unemployment-

* Statistically significant at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
# Significantly different from the reference group at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
## Significantly different from the reference group at the 95 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
~ Reference group for subgroup differences; excluded from estimation
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Table 6. Estimates of net impact of ALPs by subgroup on whether participants were employed in an
unsubsidized job or in self-employment on the survey date, in Poland
Retraining

Public works

Intervention
works

Selfemployment

Male respondentFemale respondent

0.104**
0.081**

-0.046**
-0.012

0.079**
0.145**##

0.030
0.286**##

Aged ^ 30
Aged 3 1-44
Aged 45+-

0.080**
0.170**
0.002

-0.043
-0.056
0.037

0.109**
0.185**
0.215*

0.050
0.185**
0.137*

8 years of schooling or less
Vocational secondary education~
General secondary education
Some higher education

0.062
0.083**
0.101**
0.145*

-0.069
-0.027
0.121
-0.022

0.150**
0.117**
0.153**
-0.169##

0.210**
0.137**
0.054
-0.025

White-collar occupation
Blue-collar occupationOther occupation

0.066
0.053
0.103**

0.010
-0.039*
-0.094

0.099**
0.074**
0.158**##

0.078*#
0.176**
0.144**

Voluntarily unemployed
Involuntarily unemployed-

0.142**
0.084**

-0.002
-0.046**

0.092**
0.133**

0.099*
0.146**

Long-term unemployed
Not in long-term unemployment-

0.026##
0.142**

-0.069**
-0.011

-0.052*##
0.207**

-0.04 \m

Work experience = zero
Work experience <. 3 years
Work experience > 3 yearsWork experience 2 1 1 years-1

0.095**
-0.156##
0.022

-0.032
-0.071**
-0.148*
-0.025

0.149**##
-0.215**##
-0.011

Area of low unemployment
Area of high unemployment-

0.064**#
0.116**

0.004
-0.054**

0.092**
0.133**

* Statistically significant at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
# Significantly different from the reference group at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
## Significantly different from the reference group at the 95 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
Reference group for subgroup differences; excluded from estimation
1 For public works and self-employment, work experience of 4-10 years inclusive._____________
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0.225**

0.167**
0.254**#
0.088
0.092**
0.132**
0.137**

Table 7. Impact of various features of ALPs on whether participants were employed in an unsubsidized job or
in self-employment on the survey date, in Hungary
Public
SelfIndividual
Group
service
Wage
retraining
retraining
employment
subsidy
employment
Contribution to costs
Participant contribution
No participant contribution

0.104**
0.062

0.123**
0.066**

Duration of ALP
< 1 month
1 < 3 months
3 < 6 months
6< 12 months
12+months

0.115
0.129**
0.102**
0.069**
0.084

0.019
-0.050
0.084**b
0.097**b
-0.015

Organized by
Regional centre, over 20 hrs/w
Regional centre, 20 hrs/w or less
Other, over 20 hrs/w
Other, 20 hrs/w or less

0.092
0.128
0.073**
0.105**

0.015
-0.005
0.096**a
0.107**a

Level of job skill
Non-manual
Manual unskilled
Manual semi-skilled
Manual skilled
Industry
Agriculture
Construction
Services
Other

-0.166**
-0.237**a
-0.207**
-0.160**b

-0.042
-0.059
-0.022
-0.012

-0.207**
-0.228**

0.018
-0.174**a
-0.047*b
0.028bc

Type of enterprise
Individual enterprise
Partnership or other

0.290**
0.268**
0.190**ab
0.280**c
0.223**
0.203**

* Statistically significant at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
a Significantly different from the first category at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
b Significantly different from the second category at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
c Significantly different from the third category at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
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Table 8. Impact of various features of ALPs on whether participants were employed in an unsubsidized job or
in self-employment on the survey date, in Poland________________________________
Retraining
Public works
Intervention works
Self-employment

Duration of ALP
< 1 month
1^3 months
4+ months
< 6 months
6 months
7+ months
Ownership of provider
Public
Private
Category of provider
Adult education
Employment or other organization
Industry (private)
National government
Health-care provider
Other
Type of enterprise
National administration
Services
Trade and restaurants
Manufacturing and construction

0.19**
0.12**a
0.10**a

0.10**
0.14**a

-0.05*
-0.04*
-0.11**

0.16**
0.27**a
0.08**a

-0.05**
0.10**a

0.25**
0.25**

-0.07**

0.14**
0.42**a
0.23**ab

0.14**
0.08**a
0.11**

O.Ola

0.070
0.061
0.068*
-0.033ac

* Statistically significant at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
a Significantly different from the first category at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
b Significantly different from the second category at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
c Significantly different from the third category at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
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Table 9. Elements in a cost-benefit analysis of ALPs in Hungary and Poland
EMPLNOW
1'

-

Individual retraining
Group retraining
Public service employment
Wage subsidy
Self-employment

f; ' _-...;/ .-' - ' ^~>- ' , \f :•!:/',
Retraining
Public works
Intervention works
Self-employment

Hungary
0.09**
0.07**
-0.21**
-0.06**
0.16
Poland ;
0.12**
-0.04**
0.24**
0.27**

UCPAY3

cosr

7
5**
9**
-6
-26

-43**
-27**
-9**
7
-120

205
205
346
506
299

7**
.5**
1
69

94**
103**
-178**
-258**

353
629
896
3469s

EARNNOW2

;

** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent level in a two-tailed test
'Employed in an unsubsidized job or in selfemployment on the survey date
2Average monthly earnings from the current job on the survey date (US$)
'Amount of unemployment compensation since January 1996, in US$ at 1 April 1997 exchange rate
4Average cost per participant in 1996 in the provinces studied at exchange rate of US$1.00 = 175.75 Hungarian forints or 3.068 Polish zloty, on
1 April 1997, approximately the survey date
5This cost includes the full loan amount; 50 per cent write-off on most loans if remainder repaid within certain time limit____________
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